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How NOQTIS compares

No tool is right for everything. This page says what NOQTIS does that the usual tools do not, what they do that NOQTIS does not, and what NOQTIS has not yet earned.

NOQTIS sha256sum + GPG minisign / signify Sigstore (cosign) BagIt in-toto
Post-quantum signatures yes (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, hybrids) no no no no signature depends on the signer
Signs a whole folder yes a digest list a file (signify: a digest list) one artefact digests only a statement of artefacts
Notices added files, links yes no no n/a added payload files, yes no
Works offline yes yes yes checking with a pinned root only yes yes
Needs a service no (a TSA only for timestamps) key servers, optional no Fulcio and Rekor no no
Proof of time RFC 3161 timestamp no no transparency log no no
Who signed a pinned key a key and its web of trust a pinned key an identity (OIDC) nobody a pinned key or identity
Public record of signing no no no yes no no
Show some files only yes (format 2 proofs) no no no no no
Key management yours yours yours none for the signer none yours
Encryption no (KEMs only) yes no no no no
Maturity new; not audited decades years years, wide use an RFC, wide use a CNCF project, wide use
  • Research data, code and results that must stay checkable for decades, past the point where quantum computers could forge today’s RSA, ECDSA and Ed25519 signatures.
  • Work that is unpublished, confidential or sensitive: nothing is sent to any service, and a format 2 proof can show a reviewer one table without the rest.
  • Air-gapped and offline checking: a binary, a folder and a .pub file.
  • Folders as units of evidence, where an added file must make the check fail.
  • You want no keys to manage. Sigstore’s keyless signing ties a signature to an identity, and its log shows every use. NOQTIS needs you to keep a secret key safe.
  • You need a public, append-only record that a signature was made (for software supply chains, a log you can monitor for misuse). NOQTIS has none.
  • You need to encrypt files. Use age, GPG or your platform’s tools.
  • Your readers will not install anything. sha256sum and gpg are everywhere; NOQTIS is one more binary (or a package for Python, JavaScript, R, Rust, Go or Java).
  • Container images. cosign and the registries’ signing support are built for them; NOQTIS signs folders and files.
  • You need validated cryptography (FIPS 140-3). NOQTIS implements the FIPS 203, 204 and 205 algorithms and passes the NIST test vectors, but it has no CMVP certificate. Use a validated module where policy requires one.
  • An audit. No independent firm has reviewed the code. An audit through OSTIF has been applied for and is open for funding; until a report is published, treat NOQTIS as you would any new cryptographic code. See security for what is tested and how.
  • Years of use. The format and library are new. The capsule format is specified (spec) so that other tools can check capsules without NOQTIS, but none do yet.
  • Hardware side-channel evidence. Timing is measured (dudect) and the masked code is checked against a simulated power model (TVLA); that is not a measurement on real hardware.
  • A reviewed TLS client. The https:// client for check <url> is built in only when asked for (-DNQTLS=ON); plain http:// is the default, which is safe for checking because the capsule itself is signed, but it does not hide what you fetch.

NOQTIS does not ask you to give anything up. A capsule can also carry a signed SHA256SUMS, its in-toto statement (noqtis export --as intoto) can be signed with cosign, and a BagIt copy (noqtis export --as bagit) can go to an archive that only takes bags. See the coming-from pages for each.