ProbabilisticVote: choice probabilities, expected vote shares and
(two candidates) win probability under logit, probit, Cauchy, Laplace or
uniform utility-difference errors with valence. CandidateEquilibrium:
alternating best responses of two vote-share maximisers on a grid.
HotellingPriceLocation and SalopCircle: spatial price
competition (d'Aspremont et al. 1979; Salop 1979). KalaiSmorodinsky:
Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions on a piecewise-linear frontier.
BaronFerejohn: closed-rule legislative bargaining.
VoteTradingRikerBrams: logrolling and its welfare effect.
PcaIdealPoints: principal-component ideal points.
Usage
ProbabilisticVote(
ideals,
positions,
valence = NULL,
beta = 1,
error = "logit",
weights = NULL,
A = NULL
)
CandidateEquilibrium(
ideals,
grid,
valence = c(0, 0),
beta = 1,
error = "logit",
start = NULL,
maxit = 100,
A = NULL
)
HotellingPriceLocation(a, b, t = 1, c = 0)
SalopCircle(n = NULL, t = 1, c = 0, fixed_cost = NULL, length = 1)
KalaiSmorodinsky(frontier, disagreement = c(0, 0))
BaronFerejohn(n, delta = 1, quota = NULL)
VoteTradingRikerBrams(valuations)
PcaIdealPoints(votes, dims = 1)Arguments
- ideals
Ideal-point matrix.
- positions
Candidate positions (matrix).
- valence
Candidate valences.
- beta
Spatial sensitivity.
- error
Error distribution.
- weights
Voter weights.
- A
Salience vector or matrix.
- grid
Candidate grid (matrix).
- start
Starting positions (matrix, two rows).
- maxit
Maximum iterations.
- a, b
Firm locations from the left and right ends.
- t
Transport cost.
- c
Marginal cost.
- n
Number of firms or legislators.
- fixed_cost
Entry cost.
- length
Market circumference.
- frontier
Matrix of frontier points (increasing first utility).
- disagreement
Disagreement point.
- delta
Discount factor.
- quota
Votes needed.
- valuations
Voters x issues signed intensities.
- votes
Legislator x roll-call matrix.
- dims
Number of dimensions.
References
Enelow, J. M. and Hinich, M. J. (1984). The Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge University Press.
Groseclose, T. (2001). A model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage. American Journal of Political Science 45, 862-886.
Baron, D. P. and Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review 83, 1181-1206.
Riker, W. H. and Brams, S. J. (1973). The paradox of vote trading. American Political Science Review 67, 1235-1247.