Pairwise majority relation among spatial alternatives (voter i prefers a to b
when U_i(a) > U_i(b)), with the Condorcet winner and loser, cycle detection,
the top cycle (Smith set), Miller's uncovered set, the Banks set (tops of
maximal transitive chains), Copeland and Borda scores.
Usage
MajorityTournament(voters, alternatives, model = "quadratic", ...)
Arguments
- voters, alternatives
Points.
- model
Utility model (see VoterUtility).
- ...
Passed to VoterUtility.
Value
list(margin, beats, condorcet_winner, condorcet_loser, cyclic,
top_cycle, uncovered, banks, copeland, borda); indices are 1-based.
References
Miller, N. R. (1980). A new solution set for tournaments and
majority voting. American Journal of Political Science 24, 68-96. Banks, J.
S. (1985). Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. Social Choice
and Welfare 1, 295-306.
Examples
MajorityTournament(c(0, 1, 2), c(0, 1, 2))$condorcet_winner
#> [1] 2
